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 During the so called dot-com bubble period in the late 1990s, the question of 
whether the Internet stock prices could be explained or not by companies’ fundamentals 
was intensely discussed and studied. Ten years later, the high valuations of recent 
Internet IPOs, justified mostly on the basis of a growing number of Internet users and 
less on the basis of the companies’ fundamentals, led many to wonder if the Internet 
industry is facing a valuation bubble 2.0. 
 This study explores the impact of the major (financial and non-financial) value-
drivers, identified during the previous dot-com bubble, on the recent Internet 
companies’ IPO stock price and whether that impact differs from the one observed in 
the previous dot-com wave. Additionally, by analyzing more than one non-financial 
measure at the same time we are able to identify the relative incremental explanatory 
power on the IPO stock price of those non-financial measures.  
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 No final da década de 1990, durante o período designado por bolha das dot-com, 
a questão sobre se os preços das ações das empresas no sector da Internet poderiam ou 
não ser explicados pelos seus fundamentais, foi intensamente analisada e discutida. Dez 
anos mais tarde, o facto de os elevados preços das ações nas recentes Ofertas Públicas 
Iniciais (OPIs) neste sector serem essencialmente justificadas pelo número crescente de 
utilizadores, em detrimento dos fundamentais económicos das empresas, tem levantado 
a questão se este sector tecnológico não estará perante uma nova versão da bolha do 
final da década de 1990. 
 Este estudo explora o impacto dos principais fatores (financeiros e não 
financeiros), identificados durante a anterior bolha, que influenciam o preço das ações 
das empresas de Internet, assim como se esse impacto difere do observado na anterior 
vaga de OPIs no sector das dot-com. Adicionalmente, através da análise de diversos 
indicadores não-financeiros, é possível identificar o poder explicativo relativo de cada 
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“Another bubble? Some tech start-ups look over-valued” 
 (The Economist, 2010) 
 
“It's Officially Silly Season for Internet Valuations” 
 (Forbes, 2011) 
 
In recent years, the growing number of high speed Internet users led to a new 
proliferation of “dot-coms”, especially social networking sites. The apparently rising 
buy-outs prices and the valuations of recent IPOs, justified mostly on the basis of a 
growing number of Internet users and less on the basis of the companies’ fundamentals 
(sometimes with no discernible monetization strategy), led many to wonder if tech 
industry is facing a bubble 2.0. The valuation of Internet IPOs like Facebook, Inc. 
received huge attention from the media. Several argued that Facebook’s IPO was 
grossly overvalued. Bloomberg (May 2012) reported that “Facebook would be valued at 
99 times its earnings, a higher multiple than 99 percent of companies in the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 Index”. Other cases such as the Linkedin Corporation IPO, with a first day 
underpricing of 109%, Groupon Inc. IPO, which has fallen from its $20 IPO price to 
about $7.15 in nearly nine months, contributed for the huge media hype surrounding 
this bubble hypothesis. 
During the so called dot-com bubble period in the late 1990s, many authors 
discussed and studied whether the Internet stock prices could be explained by the 
companies’ fundamentals and/or by non-financial measures. 
Regarding financial measures, some authors suggested that the financial 
information of companies from young, fast-changing, technologic industries is of 
limited value to investors and it needs to be carefully analyzed. For instance, they 
argued that in the case of the Internet industry losses enhance, not reduce, firm value 
(Van der Goot and Knauff, 2001). Trueman et al. (2000) suggested that in order to 
gather more value from the financial information provided by the companies, investors 
should pay attention not only to the net income but also to the decomposition of the net 
income into its components, as the individual income statement line items have different 
implications for future profits.  
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Additionally, several authors (Demers and Lev, 2001; Trueman et al., 2000; 
Rajgopal et al., 2000; Hand, 2001) found that web traffic (a non-financial measure) is 
also an important indicator of the market values of Internet firms, especially Business-
to-Consumer 1  (B2C) firms. Since this indicator provides information about the 
consumers’ interest in the web business, it is central to predict the revenue generation 
and growth of Business to Consumer (B2C) Internet firms (Rajgopal et al., 2000). 
Alternatively, other authors (Bhattacharya et al., 2009; DuCharme et al., 2001a; 
DuCharme et al., 2001b) suggested the media hype2 as a non-financial value driver. 
Another important topic during the dot-com bubble was the unprecedented level 
of underpricing in Internet IPOs. Although several explanations were explored, such as, 
the  riskiness of the IPO companies, the use of the IPO underpricing as a “branding” 
opportunity and the greater proportion of retail investors (less informed investors) 
entering the market,  this is still an open subject. 
 Although many studies investigated these topics during the dot-com bubble, 
despite the recent hype around a potential bubble 2.0 in Internet industry, the studies 
focusing on recent Internet IPOs are still rare or nonexistent. This dissertation tries to 
fill this gap, by analyzing the financial and non-financial value drivers of the Internet 
companies that went public in recent years.  
This study explores the impact of the major (financial and non-financial) value-
drivers, identified by former research during the previous dot-com bubble, on the  
Internet companies’ IPO stock price (and short term return) and whether that impact 
differs from the one observed in the previous dot-com wave. Additionally, by analyzing 
more than one non-financial measure at the same time we are able to identify the 
relative incremental explanatory power on the IPO stock price of the non-financial 
measures. We mostly follow Trueman et al. (2000) methodology, using a sample of 
B2C Internet IPOs, however, prior literature is extended by examining not only the 
explanatory power of web traffic as a non-financial measure, but also by considering the 
media hype as another possible non-financial measure, and by allowing the comparison 
between them. 
                                                
1 Business-to-consumer (B2C) companies are companies that provide products and services directly to 
the end user, while business-to-business (B2B) companies deal primarily with other businesses, not the 
general public. 
2 Media hype or media exposure can be defined as an intensive or exaggerated publicity in the mass 
media and can be measured using statistics such as number of mentions in the press, web and social 
media and multimedia. 
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The dissertation is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the thesis. Section 
2 outlines the IPO process, provides a brief background on the Internet industry and the 
dot-com bubble and reviews prior research on Internet stock prices (and short term 
returns) value drivers. Section 3 discusses the sample construction and provides a 
description of the data while Section 4 describes the methodology used. Section 5 
presents the results and Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
This section begins with a brief description of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
process, as well as its importance for the companies. It is followed by a revision of the 
main literature regarding the Internet industry, particularly concerning the dramatic rise 
and fall of Internet stocks in the late 90s early 2000s, usually referred as the dot-com 
bubble, and by the empirical literature regarding the IPO underpricing and posterior 
stock prices of Internet companies.  
 
2.1 The IPO process 
 
“For a company, going public typically marks the transformation from startup 
adolescence to corporate adulthood.” (Bartov et al., 2002, pp. 324) 
 
Going public is the process of offering securities of a privately owned company 
for sale to the general public (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010).  
Ross et al. (2003) define an initial public offering (IPO) or an unseasoned new 
issue as the first public equity issue that is made by a company. As explained by the 
authors, all initial public offerings are cash offers 1  because, if the firm’s existing 
shareholders were available to buy the stocks, the firm would not need to sell them 
publicly. A seasoned new issue refers to a new issue of a listed company.  
Going public is an important step in the life of a young company. Ljungqvist 
(2004) points out the following advantages of taking that step: it provides access to 
public equity capital, which may lower the company’s cost of funding; it provides a 
venue for trading the company’s stocks, enabling its existing stockholders to diversify 
their investments and to concretize their capital gains from backing the company 
(especially important for venture capitalists).  
The IPO can be made through different methods, namely the fixed price method, 
the auction or the book building method. In the fixed price method the price at which 
the securities are offered by the issuer is made known in advance to the investors. 
                                                
1 Public companies can issue securities by making a general cash offer to investors at large (cash offer) or 
by making a rights offer, offering the securities to the firm’s existing stockholders.  
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According to the auction mechanism, the issuer sets a minimum acceptable price and 
investors make bids on the offering (the bids include price and number of stocks). In the 
book building process, the underwriter and the issuer set a price range within which 
they want to set the IPO price and then the underwriter presents the stocks to a number 
of institutional investors that place non-binding indications of interest in the stock. This 
method has become the dominant IPO procedure in most major world markets, 
including the U.S. According to this method as soon as the company’s board of 
directors decides to go public, the company hires an investment banker to underwrite 
the offering. Then the company, with the help of the investment bank, drafts the 
prospectus, containing, among other things, financial information about the company 
and the terms of the offer, such as the offer price (in a firm commitment offer), stated in 
the form of a range/interval whose midpoint is the expected offer price. Upon 
completion, the prospectus is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Bartov et al. (2002) state that the time between the filing of the prospectus and 
the final offer date (“waiting period”) is used by the investment banker to collect 
information about the demand from investors through non-binding indications of 
interest. If demand for the issue is greater (lower) than initially expected, the final offer 
price will be set near the top (low) end of the interval set in the prospectus. It is a well-
documented fact that IPOs tend to be underpriced, i.e. they tend to trade significantly 
above their offer price in their debut (Bartov et al., 2002). 
As stated by Ljungqvist (2004), underpricing is estimated as the percentage 
difference between the price at which the IPO stocks were sold to investors (the offer 
price) and the price at which the stocks subsequently trade in the market. Ljungqvist 
(2004) also defines/measures underpricing as the (dollar) amount of ‘money left on the 
table’ - the difference between the aftermarket trading price and the offer price, 
multiplied by the number of stocks sold at the IPO. This calculation has an implicit 
assumption: “shares sold at the offer price could have been sold at the aftermarket 
trading price instead – that is, that aftermarket demand is price-inelastic”. As 
Ljungqvist (2004) suggested underpricing is costly to a firm’s owners: stocks sold for 
personal account are sold at too low a price, while the value of stocks retained after the 
IPO is diluted.  
Ljungqvist (2004) also concludes that underpricing in the U.S. has averaged, 
over long periods of time, between 10 and 20 percent, but as shown in Figure 1, with a 
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substantial degree of variation over time. Figure 1 illustrates the fact that it is more 
frequent to see periods of underpricing in opposition of overpricing. In the years 1999 
and 2000, U.S. issuers left an aggregate of $62 billion on the table and the average IPO 
was underpriced by 71% and 57% respectively. 
Figure 1 – Initial IPO returns in the United States, 1960 to 2003. Source: 
Ljungqvist (2004). 
The figure reports quarterly equal-weighted average initial IPO returns in % for 14,906 IPOs 
completed in the United States between 1960 and 2003, calculated as the first-day closing price 
over the IPO offer price less one. Source: Ljungqvist (2004). 
 
 
2.2 The Internet Industry 
2.2.1 Internet companies  
 
According to the website www.internet.com, Internet companies are defined as 
those companies that generate more than 51% of their revenues from or because of the 
Internet2. 
                                                
2 These criteria were used by several studies during the dot-com bubble, e.g. Hand (2000 and 2001), 
Bartov et al. (2002) and DuCharme et al. (2001a). It is important to note that the website with the domain 
www.internet.com no longer provides this information.   
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These companies, as explained by Kozberg (2001, pp. 9), “begin by making 
large expenditures on R&D to develop a site’s quality, improving their ability to retain 
viewers (proxied for by visits and time spent per person) and attract new ones via 
reputation effects. In addition, firms engage in major advertising campaigns and other 
promotions oriented towards attracting larger audiences. As audience increases so does 
the number of pages viewed, increasing the advertising and promotion based revenue 
opportunities for the firm. Increased audience could also lead to additional 
opportunities resulting from network economies of scale and scope“. 
 
2.2.2 The Dot-com Bubble 
 
Girdzijauskas and Štreimikienė (2009) state that a bubble happens when 
speculators notice the swift rise in value of stocks and then decide to buy more of the 
same stocks as a way of anticipating further rises rather than based on the belief that 
there is a general undervaluation of the stocks. Due to this buying spree, many 
companies’ stocks become grossly overvalued creating a widening discrepancy between 
the price and the actual value of the stocks. 
When the bubble bursts the stock prices will fall dramatically trying to seek the 
fundamental value of the stocks. However, as also noted by the authors, the term “stock 
market bubble” can only be used with any certainty in retrospect, after the stock’s price 
have fallen drastically or crashed. 
Barber and Odean (2001) cited by Bhattacharya et al. (2010) identify several 
market conditions that are conducive to the formation of speculative bubbles: (1) the 
availability of large amounts of capital; (2) significant uncertainty regarding firm 
valuation; and (3) an inexperienced but active investor clientele. 
The huge growth in market value of the Internet sector since its inception has led 
many, as Alan Greenspan, to speculate about the presence of a financial bubble in the 
Internet sector. In 1997, in his testimony to the U.S. Senate, the former U.S. Federal 
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan suggested the existence of a bubble: “Is it possible 
that there is something fundamentally new about this current period that would warrant 
such complacency? Yes, it is possible. Markets may have become more efficient, 
competition is more global, and information technology has doubtless enhanced the 
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stability of business operations. But, regrettably, history is strewn with visions of such 
new eras that, in the end, have proven to be a mirage. In short, history counsels 
caution”.  
Demers and Lev (2001) report that the Internet sector has evolved from a 
nascent stage industry to become the third-largest technology sector by market value in 
1999. By February 2000, as reported by Ofek and Richardson (2003), the Internet sector 
equalled 6% of the market capitalization of all U.S. public companies and 20% of all 
publicly trade equity volume. Moreover, in just a two-year period the entire sector 
generated a return over 1000% on their public equity. 
In March of 2000, three years after Alan Greenspan’s testimony, the spectacular 
rise in Internet values was followed by a dramatic fall of the prices, which continued 
throughout 2000 and led many to designate this phenomenon as the “Internet bubble” or 
the “dot-com bubble”. 
The Figure 2, by Bhattacharya et al. (2010), presents a time series chart of the 
market value of publicly-traded Internet firms beginning in 1992, when America Online 
first went public, through to the end of 2003. This graph shows the extraordinary rise in 
Internet market values, as well as the following dramatic fall. It also includes two lines, 
one representing the aggregate market capitalization of the NASDAQ (excluding 
Internet firms) and other representing the average market capitalization of NYSE firms, 
allowing us to compare the growing line of the Internet values until 2000 with the 









Figure 2 – Total Market Capitalization: Internet Industry versus Nasdaq 
and NYSE. Source: Bhattacharya et al. (2010) 
Nasdaq without Internet represents the market capitalization of all NASDAQ firms excluding 
Internet firms, scaled by a factor of 10, for greater comparability with the Internet industry. 
NYSE represents the market capitalization of all NYSE firms scaled by a factor of 20 for 
comparability. All dollar amounts are inflation-adjusted and stated in January 2003 dollars. 
 
 
However, according to Ofek and Richardson’s (2003) we cannot necessarily 
infer from this dramatic fall in Internet market values that market prices did not in fact 
reflect fundamental values about cash flows. Changing expectations about cash flows or 
discount rates, coupled with the realization of various Internet fundamentals, could also 
explain the rise and drop in prices. Several authors tried to validate this hypothesis. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2010) reported that accounting fundamentals were very weak for 
the majority of Internet IPO firms despite the optimism expressed by investors  
regarding these companies (first day returns to Internet IPOs averaged over 80%). 
According to the authors, 88% of Internet companies reported negative earnings in the 
year prior to their IPO, 91% of these  had accumulated deficits, and many Internet firms 
did not even have revenues at the time of their IPOs. In the end, over 24% of publicly-
traded Internet companies ultimately failed within five years of their IPO. 
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While some argue that revenues are the key driver of Internet stock prices, 
others defend that conventional metrics, such as earnings and book values, are irrelevant 
to the pricing of Internet stocks, because non-financial metrics “call all the shots”. 
Moreover, many analysts and commentators advocate that earnings can be relevant to 
Internet stock pricing but in an unconventional way, as larger losses can reflect Internet 
companies’ huge investments in intangible marketing assets and can therefore be related 
to higher market values. This topic, especially the value drivers of Internet stock prices, 
will be more extensively addressed in section 2.3. 
As stated before, despite the weak fundamentals for the majority of Internet IPO 
companies, the underpricing during those years exceeded the average over long periods 
of time.  Loughranand and Ritter (2004) reported that in the 1980s, the average first-day 
return on initial public offerings (IPOs) was 7%. The average first-day return doubled to 
almost 15% during 1990-1998, before jumping to 65% during the Internet bubble years 
of 1999-2000 and then decreasing to 12% during the years between 2001 and 2003. 
 
2.2.3 The Web 2.0 
 
Due to its rapid and world-wide impact on business and communications, in 
2001 Van der Goot and Knauff (2001, pp. 3) defended that “the Internet is transforming 
society and business life in a revolutionary way. Many compare the impact on society 
and business life of this "information revolution" with the industrial revolution or the 
invention of the telephone and radio”.  
Since 2001, the Internet sector continued to mature and evolve, based on a 
rapidly developing technology and serving as a point of convergence for many 
traditional and newer industries (Kozberg, 2001).  
A couple of years after the bubble burst, the concept of “Web 2.0” (contrasting 
with the "Web 1.0") was brought by John Battelle and Tim O’Reilly at the first Web 2.0 
conference, in October 2004. The purpose of the conference was to identify Internet 
transitions since the dot-com crash. O Reilly defended that “far from having "crashed", 
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the web was more important than ever, with exciting new applications and sites popping 
up with surprising regularity”.3 
 The Society for Technical Communication newsletter of March/April 2011 
defines a Web 2.0 site as one that “allows users to interact and collaborate with each 
other in a social media environment, as consumers of user-generated content in a 
virtual community. This contrasts with Web sites, which limit users to viewing content 
that they create and control. Examples of Web 2.0 include social networking sites, 
blogs, wikis, video sharing sites, hosted services, Web applications, and “folksonomies” 
(folk taxonomies)”. 
One important part of Web 2.0 is the Social Web, which represents a 
fundamental shift in the way individuals communicate. “The Social Web includes a 
number of online tools and platforms where people share their perspectives, opinions, 
thoughts and experiences. The end user is not only a user of the application, but also a 
participant by: podcasting; blogging; tagging; contributing to Really Simple 
Syndication (RSS); social bookmarking; social networking” (The Society for Technical 
Communication newsletter of March/April 2011). 
In Spencer-Scarr’s (2009, pp. 1) opinion, it has become increasingly important 
to understand Web 2.0’s impact and role in society: “over the last four years Web 2.0 
has become a pivotal phrase for a social paradigm shift which is being adopted and 
adapted by enterprise: finding its way into business methodologies and common 
technology such as mobile phones”.  
 
2.3 Drivers for Internet stock prices 
 
"Forget all the financial wizardry. Virtually every Wall Street analyst has tried to 
concoct some formula to pinpoint the correct valuation of Internet stocks. But those 
efforts are pretty much shots in the dark. The stock prices of these companies are based 
largely on what the future holds for the Web, and no crystal ball can predict that. So 
you've got to make a gut call. My gut tells me the Internet is going to be big. No, huge" - 
Linda Himelstein (BusinessWeek 4/17/99) cited by Estrada and Blakely (2009) 
 
                                                
3 Retrieved from http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html, 3 January 2013. 
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During the so called bubble period, many studies discussed this controversial 
topic (Internet companies’ valuation) more specifically whether the Internet stock prices 
could be explained by fundamentals. 
Some studies suggest that the financial information of firms in young, fast-
changing, technology based industries is of limited value to investors. Others, such as 
Demers and Lev (2001), point out that most Internet companies have also come to rely 
upon non-financial measures of web traffic activity, as indicators of the current 
performance and future cash generating ability of these intangible asset based firms. 
The availability of this data provided an opportunity for many researchers to explore 
how investors supplement relatively sparse financial information with non-financial 
data, in the valuation process (Trueman et al., 2000). 
Several studies presented evidence on the financial and non-financial value 
drivers for Internet stocks. Although the most relevant information about each paper is 
summarized in Appendix 1, a brief description of what is crucial to our analysis will be 
developed in the next section. 
 
2.3.1 Financial Drivers 
 
According to Trueman et al. (2000), there are two fundamental reasons why it 
was so difficult to value Internet firms back in the late 1990s. First, the industry and the 
firms within it were so young that there was very little historical financial information 
available to forecast future profitability. Second, the industry was evolving at such a 
rapid pace that whatever historical information existed was likely to be less useful for 
valuing these firms than for valuing those in more established industries, or even those 
in non-Internet high-tech industries. 
Several authors discussed the shortcomings of using the traditional theoretical 
valuation models to value Internet companies. 
Estrada and Blakely (2009) discuss two shortcomings of the use of the 
discounted cash flow (DCF) model valuation for Internet companies. First, they state 
that most Internet companies neither have positive cash flows nor they expect to have 
them in the foreseeable future. The lack or limited availability of historical data (used to 
estimate forecast inputs more precisely or to check reasonability of forecasts) in 
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combination with a highly uncertain future makes it possible to justify almost every 
estimate for Internet companies. In that case, the value of an Internet company depends 
solely on individual expectations of the future (Van der Goot and Knauff, 2001). 
Discount rates are typically estimated with the CAPM, which has, as a critical input, the 
company’s beta, for which several years of data are needed to estimate it. Therefore, 
Estrada and Blakely (2009) argue that another shortcoming for DCF valuation for 
Internet companies is the fact that the estimation of betas typically rely on a very limited 
(and rarely representative) history of stock returns. 
Alternatively to the absolute valuation approach of the DCF model, relative 
valuation is a widely used method for valuing Internet companies (Van der Goot and 
Knauff’s, 2001). Kim and Ritter (1999) explain that in relative valuation using 
accounting multiples, a company’s financial and operational performance is compared 
with that of several publicly owned companies in the same or a similar industry - the 
peer group. It is therefore implicit this approach works better when a highly comparable 
group is available. A problem shared between this and the other methods of relative 
valuation discussed above, is that regardless of the fact that the relative approach “can 
reduce the probability of misvaluing a firm relative to others, this approach provides no 
safeguard against an entire sector being undervalued or overvalued” (Kim and Ritter, 
1999, pp. 412). 
Attending to the mentioned shortcomings and the historical behaviour of Internet 
stock prices, especially during the dot-com bubble, several studies have tried to identify 
the main Internet stock value drivers.  
Bartov et al. (2002) results indicate that the valuation of Internet firms departs 
from conventional knowledge, with earnings not being priced and negative cash flows 
being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments. In the case of the Internet 
industry, companies invest heavily in customer base creation and brand development, 
leading to large costs in marketing and research and development (R&D) that are either 
immediately expensed in income statements or capitalised and quickly amortised. For 
that reason most of the Internet companies report losses or minimal profits, and some 
authors even defend that, in this type of companies, losses enhance, not reduce, firm 
value (Van der Goot and Knauff, 2001). 
Demers and Lev (2001) also found that product development (R&D) and 
advertising expenses (customer acquisition costs) appear to be capitalized as assets by 
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investors in their assessment of Internet company value during the bubble period, when 
investors were more optimistic about the prospects of Business-to-consumer (B2C) 
companies. However, their study concludes that after the bursting of the bubble in 2000, 
investors adopted a more skeptical attitude with regards to intangible investments 
(product development and customer acquisition costs), and the excesses of the early 
1998-1999 valuations were systematically eliminated.  
In what concerns to marketing and R&D expenses, Hand (2000) concludes that 
Internet companies’ market values are reliably positive and concave4 in selling and 
marketing and research and development expenses when net income is negative. The 
author explains that the concavity in the pricing of core net income, R&D costs and 
selling and marketing expenses runs counter to the notion that Internet companies are 
expected to benefit from extraordinary profitability stemming from large strategic 
operating options, or increasing returns-to-scale. 
 
2.3.2 Non-Financial Drivers 
 
Trueman et al. (2000) state that the Internet industry offers one important 
advantage: the availability of a substantial amount of non-financial data on Internet 
usage that can be employed in the prediction of future revenues. It is expected that 
current traffic at an Internet company’s web site (such as statistics on website page 
views and visitors, among other numbers) will be positively related to future revenues, 
as it reflects potential future demand for the company’s products and, at least indirectly, 
affects the rates the firm can charge for advertising on its web site. This indicator 
provides information about the extent of consumer interest in the web business and is 
central to revenue generation and growth of B2C Internet firms (Rajgopal et al., 2000).  
Kim and Ritter (1999) also defend that financial information seems less relevant 
for explaining relative valuation of young, fast growing companies, and therefore, 
multiples based on non-financial information should be used in this cases. 
                                                
4 As presented in Appendix 1, Hand (2000) followed a log-linear regression. 
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Trueman et al. (2000), Demers and Lev (2001), Rajgopal et al. (2000) and Hand 
(2001)5 studied how investors employ financial information, along with measures of 
Internet usage, in the valuation of Internet firms. The authors found web performance 
measures to be value-relevant to the stock prices of Internet companies, providing (often 
considerable) incremental explanatory power for stock prices and indicating that 
investors rely heavily on web traffic measures. 
The previous studies focused mainly on the web traffic as a non-financial value 
driver for Internet stock prices. However, some studied the pricing of the Internet stocks 
during the dot-com bubble focused on the media hype as a non-financial value driver. 
DuCharme et al. (2001a) cite Robert Shiller in his book, Irrational Exuberance 
“the effect of the media on investor psychology is undoubtedly one of the driving factors 
behind the bull market” and seek to provide empirical evidence on the importance of 
creating “buzz” to promote Internet valuations in the “new economy”. The authors 
found strong evidence that underpricing increases with the extent of media exposure, 
especially coverage in the electronic media, that the firm attracts seven days before the 
IPO date. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2009) found out that there was more media coverage for 
Internet firms than for non-Internet firms and that coverage was more positive for 
Internet IPOs in the bubble period and more negative post-bubble. However, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2009) also show that the media coverage was not a significant 




                                                
5 Trueman et al. (2000) used the unique users and page views as web traffic measures. For a given firm, 
unique visitors is the estimated number of different individuals who visit the firm’s web site(s) during a 
particular month. Page views is the estimated number of pages viewed by those individuals visiting the 
firm’s web site(s) during the month.  
Demers and Lev (2001) used the reach, stickiness and customer loyalty as web traffic measures. “Reach” 
factor reflects the extent to which the Internet company is able to attract unique visitors. “Stickiness” 
captures the notion of how long visitors stay at the site once they’re there. “Customer loyalty” is driven 
primarily by the average number of visits to the site per unique visitor per period. 
Rajgopal et al. (2000) used the unique visitors as web traffic measure. Unique visitors as the number of 
web-active individuals who visited a particular site(s) belonging to a web property (company) within a 
given time period. Each visitor is represented only once as a unique user. 
Hand (2001) used the number of unique visitors to the firm’s web site. 
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2.4 Explanations for the underpricing in internet IPOs 
 
Several studies suggest possible hypotheses for the unprecedented underpricing in 
Internet IPOs during the dot-com bubble. 
 
2.4.1 Riskier IPOs are more underpriced than less-risky IPOs 
 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) conclude that high-tech, Internet-related and 
younger firms suffer from ex-ante uncertainty and have to accept a higher degree of 
underpricing. According to Loughran and Ritter (2004), the changing risk composition 
hypothesis, introduced by Ritter (1984), assumes that riskier IPOs will be underpriced 
by more than less-risky IPOs. This prediction follows models where underpricing arises 
as an equilibrium condition to induce investors into participating in the IPO market. 
Risk can reflect either technological or valuation uncertainty. 
 
2.4.2 The use of the IPO as a “branding” opportunity 
 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and DuCharme et al. (2001a; 2001b) argue that 
in some cases the underpricing is driven by the IPO as a “branding” opportunity where 
high visibility of a severely discounted IPO might serve a marketing function.  
 DuCharme et al. (2001a) defend that underpricing is a “branding” event that 
generates increased consumer awareness and possibly higher sales revenues. If 
entrepreneurs view the IPO event as a major “branding” opportunity, they should be 
willing to pay something (in foregone proceeds) for the increased media attention at the 
time of the offer, especially if it generates incremental business transactions in the 
firm’s future. Considering that the benefits to the business to business (B2B) Internet 
firms would be minimal, this hypothesis is largely driven in the Internet market space 
by the B2C companies. 
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2.4.3 A shift in the type of investors entering the market (greater proportion of 
retail investors) 
 
Ofek and Richardson (2003) provided another possible explanation for 
underpricing during the dot-com bubble. Contrary to previous assumptions the authors 
reject the idea that prices reflect fundamental values of cash flows, instead they argue 
that higher valuation reflects the fact that “optimistic” investors overwhelm 
“pessimistic” ones. 
In Internet-related industries there was no past history to guide investors, so it is 
possible that individual investors believed the hype about the Internet and transferred 
those beliefs into asset prices, ignoring information about cash flows. 
Ofek and Richardson (2003) also show evidence that suggests the Internet sector 
was more prone to retail than institutional investing at least relative to non-Internet 
firms - a considerable number of new and less sophisticated (i.e., retail) investors were 
trading Internet stocks. The magnitude of the volume suggests this may have been at 
unparalleled levels. 
The authors conclude that there were many optimistic investors arriving to the 
market willing to pay high prices for Internet stocks. They argue that if more retail 
investors were in the market than under normal conditions, then one might reasonably 
argue that the market was more prone to the types of behavioral biases that lead to 
overly optimistic beliefs.  
In sum, while the first two hypotheses provide rational explanations to 
underpricing, the third hypothesis suggests that underpricing might result from irrational 





3 Data Sources and Sample Description 
 
To study the impact of the major (financial and non-financial) value-drivers on 
the IPO pricing (and short term return) of Internet companies from the Web 2.0, a 
sample of recent transactions was gathered from Capital IQ8. 
 
3.1 Sample Selection Criteria 
 
The selected sample covers the period from January 2009 to February 2013 and was 
chosen using the following screens in Capital IQ database:  
1) Transaction Types: “Public Offerings”; 
2) Transaction Primary Features: “Public Offering – IPO”; 
3) All Transactions Closed Date:  “[1/1/2009-2/8/2013]”; 
4) IPO Exchange: “All US Exchanges”; 
5) Industry Classifications (Target/Issuer): “Internet Software and Services 
(Primary)” OR “Internet Retail (Primary)”; 
6) SIC Codes (Target/Issuer): “7370 Computer programming, data processing, and 
other computer related services” OR “7371 Computer programming services” 
OR “7372 Prepackaged software”. 
 
Given these constraints, Capital IQ retrieved 135 companies. The sample was then 
restricted to those 52 Internet companies for which non-financial measures, such as  
web traffic measures, are expected to be economically important, more precisely to 
Business to Consumer (B2C) firms. In the end, 11 companies that went public in over-
the-counter (OTC) markets were dropped, because the information available is not the 
same as to normal IPOs and 1 company was dropped because basic information, such as 
the number of outstanding stocks, was not found. 
The appendix 2 provides a list of the remaining 40 B2C Internet companies that 
comprises the final sample. 
 
 
                                                
8 www.capitaliq.com 
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3.2 Data Sources 
 
The financial data collected from Capital IQ, specifically the book value, total 
assets, sales, net income, gross profits, marketing expenses, R&D expenses, was 
collected from the last fiscal year before the IPO date. The stock prices for the end of 
the first day of trading were obtained from Google Finance9.  
 The web traffic measures, such as the monthly Unique Visitors and Page Views, 
were obtained from Compete database10. Compete estimates site traffic and engagement 
metrics based on the daily browsing activity of over 2,000,000 U.S. Internet users. 
According to Compete’s definition, the Unique Visitors metric only counts a person 
once, no matter how many times they visit a site in a given month. Unique Visitors are 
typically used to determine how popular a site is. The Page Views metric is used as an 
engagement metric. Each time a webpage is accessed by a visitor, it counts as one page 
view, irrespective of how many times the same user views the same page. Web traffic 
data for 13 companies was not available, since the database just retrieves data for the 
last 2 years.  
The Media Hype variable, measured as the number of mentions of the company in 
the press, web and social media and multimedia, was collected on Factiva database. As 
in other studies, we restrict our search to seven days before the IPO to minimize the 
possibility of picking up the announcement of real economic actions, other than the 
IPO. Factiva is a business information and research tool owned by Dow Jones & 
Company, providing access to several sources, such as 
newspapers, journals, magazines, photos, etc. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the entire sample. As reflected in the 
table, the average IPO price is $16.75 (the median is 14.75) and it ranges from the $6.5 
by Vipshop Holdings Limited to the $45 by LinkedIn Corporation. Regarding the Price-
to-sales ratio (P/S ratio), the mean (median) value is 10.42 (5.04). Our average P/S 
ratios is more than twice than the average P/S ratio (4.61) presented by Damodaran for a 




sample of 194 Internet companies as of January 201311.This difference emphasizes the 
possibility of a dot-com bubble 2.0 on Internet IPOs. The maximum value of 71.32 
occurred in the Renren Inc IPO while the minimum value of 0.47 occurred in the Sky 
mobi Limited IPO. The P/S ratio increases in the 1st day of trading, being on average 
13.92.   
The average (median) underpricing, measured as the first day return is 25.38% 
(16.19 %). The Youku Tudou Inc. IPO was the one that left “more money in the table” 
with an underpricing of 161.25%, while SouFun Holdings Ltd. IPO was the most 
overpriced, with a negative return of 56.75% after the 1st day of trading. 
 The net income in the year before the IPO is, on average, 127.62 million dollars 
while the median value is only slightly positive (1.2 million dollars). On the contrary, 
the net income margin (net income deflated by sales) is on average negative while the 
median value is slightly positive (0.59%). The average (median) gross profit is equal to 
477.60 million dollars (114.07 million dollars). 
 Regarding the other net income components, the companies in our sample 
present, in the year before the IPO, an average (median) value for Marketing Expenses 
and R&D Expenses equal to 55.34 million dollar (31.67 million dollars) and 88.18 
million dollars (16.34 million dollars), respectively. Deflated by sales, the average 
Marketing Expenses ratio is equal to 25.64% and is twice the average R&D Expenses 
ratio (13.40%). Surprisingly, one company reported no Marketing Expenses, and three 
reported no R&D Expenses, including Groupon, Inc. Nevertheless the fact that 
Groupon, Inc. didn’t report any R&D expenses, it is not surprising and it is consistent 
with the aggressive acquisition strategy followed by this company, the fact that 
Groupon, Inc. reported the highest MKTG/S ratio of our sample, an astonish value of 
92.81%. 
 Finally, regarding non-financial measures and not surprisingly, Facebook, Inc. 
IPO (2,870) (followed by Zynga, Inc., Groupon, Inc., Pandora Media, Inc. and LinkedIn 
Corporation) scores the highest value for the media hype variable. It’s important to 
notice that from all these companies, LinkedIn Corporation is the only one on the group 
of 10 companies with the highest underpricing values (in third place). 
                                                
11  http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ 
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 With respect to the Internet usage measures, the average (median) of unique 
visitors per month at our firms’ web sites is 10.38 million (1.32 million) and the average 
(median) of page views per month is 2,505.92 million (14.97 million). Once again, not 
surprisingly, Facebook, Inc. leads in terms of unique visitors and page views per month. 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
IPO price ($) 40 16.75 14.75 8.63 6.50 45.00
IPO price/Sales ($) 40 10.42 5.04 13.85 0.47 71.32
1st day end-price ($) 40 21.55 17.50 15.46 6.00 94.00
1st day end-price/Sales ($) 40 13.92 5.62 19.88 0.35 91.75
1st day underpricing (%) 40 25.38 16.19 45.52 -56.75 161.25
Net Income ($ million) 40 127.62 1.20 642.48 -389.60 3,817.00
Net income margin (%) 40 -7.94 0.59 40.28 -124.50 59.97
Gross Profit ($ million) 40 477.60 114.07 1,615.44 -46.50 9,915.00
Gross Margin (%) 40 62.22 68.23 26.38 -30.27 92.88
Marketing Expenses ($ million) 40 55.34 31.67 78.52 0.00 393.00
Marketing Expenses/Sales (%) 40 25.64 20.84 22.48 0.00 92.81
R&D Expenses ($ million) 40 88.18 16.34 329.87 0.00 2,073.00
R&D Expenses/Sales (%) 40 13.40 10.84 11.52 0.00 42.50
Media Hype 40 97 12 452 0 2,870
Unique visitors (million) 26 10.38 1.32 29.63 0.00 152.64
Page views (million) 26 2,505.92 14.97 12,233.14 0.00 62,476.26







 Regarding the methodology we follow Trueman et al. (2000) although we 
extend their model by examining not only the explanatory power of web traffic as a 
non-financial measure, but also the media hype as a possible explanatory non-financial 
variable, and by allowing the comparison between them. 







TAY  210 )log(.'                                   (4.1) 
 
 Our dependent variables (y), proxy for equity value, include the Price/Sales ratio 
measured at the time of the IPO (IPOPRICE/S) and Price/Sales ratio measured at the 
end of the first day (1stdayENDPRICE/S). This model is also used to analyze whether 
some of the exogenous variables can help predicting the level of underpricing. In this 
last case the underpricing is measured as the first day return (1stdayUNDERP). 
 The use of the price-to-sales ratio, rather than price-to-book as dependent 
variable, follows Demers and Lev (2001) study and is explained by the fact that Internet 
companies have few intangible assets and their expenditures on the intangible assets are 
generally expensed rather than capitalized. Therefore the price-to-book ratio does not 
have the same economic interpretation as it does in the cross-section of more 
established and profitable firms, assuming several times a negative value. 
 As explanatory variables we use the net income margin (net income divided by 
sales) of the IPO firm in the year before the IPO (NTINC/S), controlled by firm size, 






                                                
12 As suggested by Wooldridge (2008), the logarithm is used in order to narrow the range of the variable. 
This makes estimates less sensitive to outlying (or extreme) observations on the Total Assets variable. 
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 Following Trueman et. al (2000) we then decompose the net income variable 















TAY  &)log(. 43210           (4.2) 
 
 At this stage, instead of using the net income margin as explanatory variables we 
include: Gross Margin, gross profits (revenues minus cost of revenues) divided by sales 
(GP/S); Marketing Expenses divided by sales (MKTG/S) and R&D Expenses divided 
by sales (R&D/S). All measured in the last fiscal year before the IPO. By decomposing 
net income into its components, we allow for the possibility that the individual income 
statement line items can provide more information regarding future cash-flows. This 
could be the case of investors considering some expenses to actually be investments in 
the company’s future cash-flows. This decomposition is particularly important for 
Internet firms that are growing rapidly, and spending significant amounts of money to 
ensure the continuation of this growth (Trueman et. al, 2000). 
 Finally, we augment regressions (4.1) and (4.2) by including alternately three 
non-financial measures as explanatory variables. We include a measure of media hype, 
and two measures of web traffic, the number of unique visitors and page views. Media 
hype is measured by the natural logarithm of the number of mentions of the company in 
the press, web and social media and multimedia seven days before the IPO and the 
natural logarithm of Unique Visitors (log VISITORS) and the natural logarithm of Page 
Views (log PAGEVIEWS), as measures of the number of unique visitors and page 
views.. Based on prior literature (Hand, 2001; Trueman et. al, 2000; Rajgopal et al., 
2000), we expect signs of these variables to be positive. 
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5 Analysis and discussion of results 
 
5.1 Price/Sales as the dependent variable 
 
 In Tables 2 and 3 we report the coefficients of regressing the Internet 
companies’ price-to-sales (“P/S”) ratios on a number of financial statement variables 
and non-financial variables, such as a media hype measure and two web traffic 
performance measures. We estimate these regressions at two different stages: at the IPO 
and at the end of the first trading day. 
 In regressions I and II of each Table we report the results of regressing P/S on 
net income, and on some of the components of net income, respectively (with all 
variables deflated by sales), without including any of the non-financial measures. Then 
we alternately include the non-financial variables in order to analyze the incremental 
explanatory power of these variables. 
 
5.1.1 IPOPRICE/Sales as the dependent variable 
 
 As shown in Table 2, the impact of the net income margin (NTINC/S) on the 
IPO price is negative. However, it is only with the inclusion of non-financial measures 
that the coefficient associated to the net income margin is statistically significant. 
 These results are consistent with the results of other authors, such as Van der 
Goot and Knauff (2001), and suggest that, in this type of companies, losses enhance, not 
reduce, firm value, because the negative net income of Internet companies is a 
consequence of their investments in customer base creation and brand development 









Table 2 - Regressions for IPOPRICE/S
 
VARIABLES I II III IV V VI VII VIII
NTINC/S -14.133 -16.218* -29.824** -31.281***
(8,497) (8,857) (10.899) (10.841)
GP/S 9.640* 4.898 21.921 15.130
(5,153) (4.223) (19.811) (18.461)
MKTG/S 14.679 12.555 18.139 16.260
(13.000) (14.275) (21.030) (21.108)
R&D/S 37.071 50.956 35.655 37.931
(26.351) (32.669) (34.547) (35.881)
Log MHYPE 6.891*** 2.264
(2.378) (3,784)
Log VISITORS 2.654* -1.250
(1,534) (2,621)
Log PAGEVIEWS 3.476** 0.538
(1,257) (1,839)
Log TA 0.588 2.800 -1.007 2.880 5.603 4.551 5.043 4.407
(2.996) (3.581) (2.962) (4.789) (3.532) (6.240) (3.027) (6,058)
Constant 7.924 -10.843 2.962 -12.198 -20.554 -16.883 -28.343* -22.773
(6.708) (10.377) (5.983) (11.678) (13.131) (15.405) (14.363) (17.411)
Observations 40 40 38 38 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.167 0.254 0.304 0.318 0.473 0.250 0.549 0.244
Adjusted R-squared 0.122 0.169 0.242 0.212 0.398 0.054 0.484 0.046
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The results report White adjusted t-statistics to account for heteroscedasticity.
Originals Media Hype Unique Visitors Page Views
 
 
 These results are also consistent with Trueman et al. (2000) results, who 
detected a negative association between net income and market value. However, due to 
a very small adjusted R2 (only 3 percent), the authors claimed that financial statement 
information is of very limited use in the valuation of Internet firms. In our case, the 
usefulness of the net income increases significantly if non-financial measures, such as 
media hype, unique visitors or pages views are included in the regressions. 
 The use of the components of net income (model II, IV, VI, VIII) only help  
explaining the IPO price in the cases where non-financial measures are not included. 
When non-financial measures are not included, the use of the components of net income 
(model II) - the coefficient associated to the Gross Margin - is statistically significant. 
The other components, MKTG/S and R&D/S, are insignificant in all the estimated 
regressions. These results suggest that, as concluded by Trueman et al. (2000), the 
financial statements per se are of limited use in valuing Internet firms. 
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 The coefficients associated to the non-financial measures are only statistically 
significant when included with the net income margin. In the presence of the net income 
components (regressions IV, VI, VIII), these variables lose their statistically significant 
predictive capability. This might suggest that the individual income statement line items 
and the non-financial measures may capture, at least partly, the same information. Once 
the information conveyed by the components of net income is taken into account, the 
informational role of media hype disappears.  
 The results clearly show that non-financial measures are very important 
explaining IPO prices, particularly when the components of net income are not 
available. All three coefficients associated to non-financial measures are statistically 
significant and the adjusted R2 jumps from 0.122 in the regression without any non-
financial measure to 0.242, 0.398 and 0.484 in the regression with media hype, unique 
visitors and page views variables included, respectively. 
The result regarding media hype is opposite to the findings of Bhattacharya et al. 
(2009) that concluded that the media coverage was not a significant factor in the 
Internet bubble. However it is consistent with prior literature (Demers and Lev, 2001; 
Trueman et al., 2000; Rajgopal et al., 2000; Hand, 2001) regarding web traffic 
measures.  
 Comparing the impact of all non-financial measures, the results suggest the two 
web traffic measures (the logarithm of Unique Visitors and the logarithm of Page 
Views) have more explanatory power of the IPO price (adjusted R2 of 0.398 and 0.484, 
respectively) than the media hype (0.242). Notwithstanding, the impact of all variables 
is aligned, and considering that the media hype data is normally available for more 
companies (40 vs. 26 in our sample) than the web traffic measures, media hype can 
substitute web traffic measures in helping to predict IPO prices of Internet companies. It 
is also important to note that the use of any of the non-financial variables along with the 
net income can substitute, with better results, the use of the components of net income, 
as the regressions that include non-financial (alongside with net income) have more 
explanatory power than the regressions that used the components of net income as 
exogenous variables.  
 Finally, it’s important to notice that the firm size (proxy by the natural logarithm 
of Total Assets) is insignificant in all regressions. 
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5.1.2 1stdayENDPRICE/Sales as the dependent variable 
 
 The IPO price is defined by the underwriter (investment bank) and the company 
directors. Although the final IPO price should reflect the expected market stock price, 
there are several motivations (discussed earlier in the literature review) that can lead the 
investment bank and the company directors to set an IPO price above (or, as normally 
happens, below) the market stock price. To account for that, in this section, the stock 
price at the end of the 1st trading day (deflated by sales) (1stdayENDPRICE/Sales) will 
be used as proxy for the market equity value of Internet companies. Although, the 
results are in general similar to those for the regressions from the previous section, as 
shown in Table 3, there are some differences that deserved to be pointed. 
 
Table 3 - Regression for 1stdayENDPRICE/S 
 
VARIABLES I II III IV V VI VII VIII
NTINC/S -20.630** -21.488* -37.773** -39.705***
(10,020) (10.598) (14.378) (13.921)
GP/S 6.287 1.634 28.390 20.567
(7.966) (6.484) (24.385) (22.182)
MKTG/S 22.761 19.355 23.801 21.951
(20.277) (22.472) (28.660) (28.333)
R&D/S 81.660** 99.703** 56.766 59.154
(39.990) (47.677) (45.341) (46.589)
Log MHYPE 8.921** 1.520
(3.337) (5.133)
Log VISITORS 4.601*** -0.453
(1.624) (2.764)
Log PAGEVIEWS 5.388*** 1.503
(1.422) (1.783)
Log TA -0.487 3.678 -2.888 4.328 5.813 5.034 4.864 4.693
(3.920) (4.674) (4.114) (6.242) (4.539) (7.574) (4.176) (7.396)
Constant 13.415 -15.351 8.513 -16.787 -30.005** -28.447 -38.997** -35.315*
(9.757) (13.353) (9.482) (15.404) (13.099) (16.543) (15.992) (19.814)
Observations 40 40 38 38 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.177 0.354 0.251 0.403 0.457 0.310 0.541 0.317
Adjusted R-squared 0.132 0.280 0.185 0.309 0.379 0.125 0.475 0.138
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The results report White adjusted t-statistics to account for heteroscedasticity.




 First, the coefficients associated to net income margin are now all statistically 
significant, even in the case where none non-financial measures are included in the 
model. This result suggests that the market attributes more importance to the firms’ net 
income margin when valuing IPO stocks from Internet companies, than the investment 
banks when setting up the offering price. Another important difference is related to net 
income components, while IPO price was related with the company’s Gross Margin, 
market prices are more sensible to R&D expenses. The coefficients associated to this 
variable are positive and statistically significant (when not included with web traffic 
measures). This result is consistent with the findings of Demers and Lev (2001, pp. 356) 
for the dot-com bubble period. The authors concluded that “despite the expensing in 
financial reports of all periodic expenditures on knowledge, customer acquisitions, and 
technology, investors make a distinction between expenses and investments. In 
particular, product development (R&D) and advertising expenses (customer acquisition 
costs) appear to be capitalized as assets by investors in their assessment of Internet 
company value during the “bubble” period when investors were more optimistic about 
the prospects of B2C companies”. Demers and Lev (2001) conclude however that after 
the bursting of the bubble in 2000, investors adopted a more skeptical attitude regarding 
intangible investments, which, as suggested by our results, appears to be lost once 
again.  
 Finally, coefficients associated to web traffic are of increased significance when 
included alongside with net income margin (regression V and VII).  
 
5.2 Underpricing as the dependent variable 
 
5.2.1 1st day Underpricing as the dependent variable 
 
The Table 4 shows the coefficients of regressing the Internet companies’ 
underpricing on the same financial and non-financial variables used before. 
 Given that investment banks and companies directors, when defining the IPO 
offering price, are more influenced by the Gross Margin, while investors/market 
attribute more importance to R&D Expenses, it is unsurprisingly that underpricing is 
negatively related to the former and positive related to the latter. However, the negative 
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impact of Gross Margin on underpricing only holds if web traffic measures are not 
included. On the opposite and consistently with our previous results, the coefficient 
associated to R&D Expenses is always statistically significant. 
 
Table 4 - Regression for 1stdayUNDERP 
VARIABLES I II III IV V VI VII VIII
NTINC/S -0.291 -0.238 -0.80 -0.89
(0.237) (0.248) (0.114) (0.106)
GP/S -0.644* -0.650* 0.377 0.385
(0.356) (0.367) (0.380) (0.400)
MKTG/S 0.627 0,570 0.268 0.282
(0.372) (0.411) (0.285) (0.264)
R&D/S 1.822** 2.047** 1.057** 1.045***
(0.759) (0.804) (0.471) (0.465)
Log MHYPE 0.52 -0.034
(0.115) (0.114)
Log VISITORS 0.086* 0.039
(0.042) (0.049)
Log PAGEVIEWS 0.072 0.033
(0.043) (0.045)
Log TA -0.024 0.86 -0.45 0.115 -0.015 0.048 -0.032 0.041
(0.102) (0.107) (0.112) (0.125) (0.112) (0.106) (0.120) (0.108)
Constant 0.287 0.049 0.302 0.039 -0.284 -0.647* -0.251 -0.641*
(0.255) (0.328) (0.269) (0.345) (0.287) (0.328) (0.317) (0.335)
Observations 40 40 38 38 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.070 0.294 0.056 0.306 0.141 0.388 0.136 0.390
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.213 -0.027 0.197 0.018 0.227 0.013 0.229
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The results report White adjusted t-statistics to account for heteroscedasticity.
Originals Media Hype Unique Visitors Page Views
 
 
 Another alternative explanation for these results would be, knowing that Internet 
companies are riskier companies, issuers of riskier IPOs may have to underprice their 
IPO stock prices relative to the actual value of the stocks, in order to induce investors to 
participate in the IPO, inducing the underpricing. If indeed underpricing is as a sign of 
the riskiness of the IPO, our results suggest that a higher amount of sales spent on R&D 
expenses is a sign of a riskier Internet company and so, the issuer has to induce a higher 
underpricing, while a higher Gross Margin is a sign of a more stable and mature 
company and so the issuer can induce a lower level of underpricing. 
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 Regarding the non-financial measures, the coefficients associated to the media 
hype variable are not statistically significant. This conclusion is contrary to the findings 
of DuCharme et al. (2001a) - having found strong evidence that underpricing increases 
with the extent of media exposure, especially coverage in the electronic media the firm 
attracts seven days before the IPO date. However, this result is consistent with the fact 
that the media hype impact both the offer price and the market price (measured as the 
price at the end of the 1st trading day). 
 The only non-financial measure significantly related to the underpricing is the 
number of visitors, suggesting that investors attribute more value to the number of 
visitors than the investment bank and the companies’ directors when setting up the 
offering price or, alternatively, that the number of visitors, given  its volatility over 
time, is a measure of the company’s riskiness. A final justification for this relation 
between the number of visitors and the underpricing, can lay on the fact that this 
measure could be seen as an indicator of irrational attractiveness of the IPO (in part the 
result that we were expecting for the media hype). This means that the underpricing is 
higher with a greater number of page visitors, not because the IPO price is not reflecting 
fundamental values about cash flows, but because investors are influenced by the hype 
about the Internet and some specific companies and transfer those beliefs into the stock 
price, ignoring information about cash flows.  
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
 Despite the recent hype around a potential bubble 2.0 in Internet industry, the 
studies focusing on recent Internet IPOs value drivers are still rare or nonexistent. This 
dissertation tries to fill this gap, by exploring the impact of the major (financial and 
non-financial) value-drivers, identified by former research during the previous dot-com 
bubble, on the  Internet companies’ IPO stock price  and whether that impact differs 
from the one observed in the previous dot-com wave.  
 Consistent with the results of previous research this study finds that the lower 
the net income margin, the higher the IPO price. Although this result may apparently be 
counterintuitive, many authors, analysts and commentators defend that on Internet 
companies, losses enhance, not reduce, firm value, since their low (or even negative) net 
income is a consequence of investments in customer base creation and brand 
development. Our study shows that the use of the net income to predict the IPO price 
increases significantly if non-financial measures, such as media hype, unique visitors or 
pages views are included in the regressions. On the contrary, the use of the components 
of net income, more specifically the Gross margin only help to explain the IPO price in 
the cases where non-financial measures are not included. These results suggest that, as 
concluded by Trueman et al. (2000), the financial statements per se are of limited use in 
valuing Internet firms. 
 When the price is determined by the trading market (at the end of first trading 
day), we found a positive significant coefficient for R&D/S (when not included with 
web traffic measures). This result is consistent with the previous finding and with the 
results of Demers and Lev (2001) study for the bubble period. The authors conclude that 
the product development (R&D) appear to be capitalized as assets by investors in their 
assessment of Internet company value during the bubble. Demers and Lev (2001) 
conclude, however, that after the bursting of the bubble in 2000, investors adopted a 
more skeptical attitude with regards to intangible investments, which as suggested by 
our results, appears to be lost once again. 
 Consistent with the results obtained during the dot-com bubble, we found that in 
recent years Internet companies’ stock prices are still strongly impacted by non-
traditional value-drivers. We noticed a positive significant association between Media 
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Hype/Web traffic measures and the P/S ratio at the two different stages, but only when 
included with net income margin. We found the incremental explanatory power of web 
traffic measures (especially page views) to be more relevant to predict P/S ratio rather 
than the media hype variable.  
 The results found for media hype (when compared with the ones during the dot-
com bubble) might suggest that the Internet itself, as a worldwide channel for media 
spread, with its increasing rate of penetration and usage over the years and its new ways 
to communicate, may lead to an increasing association between media hype and Internet 
stock prices. This finding assumes greater importance if we consider this sector to be 
more prone to retail than institutional investing, where less sophisticated but active 
investors believe the hype about the Internet and transfer those beliefs into asset prices, 
ignoring information about cash flows. 
 We also found that the adjusted R2 is incrementally higher on the price at the end 
of the first trading day than on the offering price, which suggests that the market 
attributes more importance to our explanatory variables when valuing IPO stocks from 
Internet companies, than the investment banks when setting up the offering price.  
 Consistently with our previous results, we found Gross Margin to have a 
negative impact and R&D Expenses to have a positive impact. Since underpricing can 
be interpreted as a sign of the riskiness of the IPO, the results suggest that the higher the 
amount of sales spent on R&D expenses, the higher the Internet company risk and, on 
the other hand, the higher the Gross Margin, the lower the risk of the Internet company. 
 Regarding non-financial measures, only the number of visitors is significantly 
related to the underpricing, suggesting that investors attribute more value to the number 
of visitors than the investment bank and the companies’ directors when setting up the 
offering price or, alternatively, that the number of visitors, given its extreme volatility 
over time, is a measure of the company’s risk. Another possible justification for this 
relation between the number of visitors and the underpricing, can be the fact that this 
measure could be seen as an indicator of irrational attractiveness of the IPO. This means 
that the underpricing is higher with a greater number of page visitors, not because the 
IPO price is not reflecting fundamental values about cash flows, but because investors 
are influenced by the hype about the Internet and some specific companies and transfer 
those beliefs into the stock price, ignoring information about cash flows.  
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 Overall, our findings lead us to conclude that in recent years, Internet 
companies’ value drivers still depart from conventional wisdom, with net income being 
negatively priced and R&D expenses viewed as investments and positively priced. Our 
results suggest that the availability of a substantial amount of non-financial data on 
Internet usage is being used by investors to supplement the relatively sparse financial 
information with non-financial data in the valuation process, being employed in the 
prediction of future revenues, as it provides information about the extent of consumer 
interest in the web business and is central to revenue generation and growth of Business 
to Consumer (B2C) Internet firms. 
 Our findings are, of course, constrained by the fact that our final sample has only 
40 companies and by the availability of only 26 observations for web traffic data.  
 There are many additional issues of interest that lie within this line of research 
and could be explored in the future. Considering the several M&A transactions in the 
Internet industry in recent years (e.g. the acquisition of Instagram by Facebook and 
several others less hyped), one particularly promising area for future work is to explore 
the value drivers of Internet B2C companies mergers and acquisitions transaction 
prices, comparing the results with the ones found in this work. Another interesting 
investigation for future work is to study the association between the level of 
underpricing of these IPOs and their long-run performance, validating if, as defended by 
some authors, higher levels of underpricing are an indicator for a poor long-run 
performance. Given that the vast majority of the IPOs studied occurred in recent years, 
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Appendix 1: Summary of studies regarding Internet stock prices value drivers 




Value Drivers (Explanatory Variables) Studies 





84 B2C Internet Companies P/S 
(i) Marketing Expenses; 
(ii) Product development 
and R&D expenses; 
(iii) Cash burn; 
Web Traffic: 
   (i)  Reach; 
   (ii) Stickiness; 
   (iii) Customer loyalty; 
   (iv) Strategic Alliances; 
Demers and Lev 
(2000) 
56 
Internet Companies:  
  (i) portals; 
  (ii) content/community 
providers; 
  (iii) e-tailers; 
MV/BV 
(i)   Net Income; 
(ii)  Gross Profits; 
(iii) Operating Expenses; 
(iv) Non Operatig 
Expenses; 
Web Traffic: 
   (i)  unique monthly 
visitors; 
   (ii) pageviews; 
Trueman et al. 
(2000) 
92 
Internet Companies:  
  (i) portals; 
  (ii) content/community 
providers; 
  (iii) e-tailers; 
  (iv) financial services 
sites; 
MV 
(i)  Earnings; 
(ii) Book Value; 
Log (Total assets) - scale 
control 
Web Traffic: 
   (i) unique monthly 
visitors; 




Test sample: Internet 
Companies; 
(i)   Initial prospectus price; 
(ii)  Final offer price; 
(iii) Initial stock market price;
Estimating three alternative 
specifications:  
earnings, cash flows, and 
sales as our performance 
measures; 
(i)    Earnings p/share; 
(ii)  Operating Cash Flow 
p/share; 
(iii) Sales p/share; 
(iv) Book value p/share; 
(v)  Annual sales growth; 
(vi) R&D p/share; 
(i)    Float - percentage of 
outstanding shares publicly 
traded; 
(ii)   Partial - position of the 
final offer price relative to 
the expected price; 
(iii) Other control variables;
Bartov et al. 
(2002) 98 non internet 
companies 
Control Sample (criteria: 
the IPO date and the IPO 
size): Non Internet 
Companies; 






Value Drivers (Explanatory Variables) 
Studies 
(author/year) No. Of 
Companies Type of Companies Financial Information Non-Finantial Information
          
Log-linear 
regression 
274 net firms; 
 
274 non net 
firms; 
 
213 non net 
firms that 
went public at 
the same time 
as the internet 
companies; 




   (1) Random sample of 
publicly traded non 
internet companies; 
   (2) Sample of publicly 
traded non internet 
companies that went 
public at the same time as 
the internet companies; 
Log MVEquity 
(i)   Log BV; 
(ii)    Log Core NI; 
(iii)   Log Net Sales; 
(iv)   Log Expenses; 
(v)    Log Cost of Sales; 
(vi)   Log General Expenses;
(vii)  Log R&D; 




    
 Log MVEquity 
(i)     Log Book value of 
equity; 
(ii)   Log Forecasted one year 
ahead earnings; 
(iii)  Log Forecasted long run 
growth in earnings; 
 
Web traffic: 
  (i)   Log number of unique 
visitors; 
  (ii)  Log number of page 
views; 
  (iii) Log number of hours 
spent on the page views; 
Supply and demand forces 
proxies: 
  (i)   Log public float; 
  (ii)  Log percentage of public 
float sold short; 
  (iii) Log degree of 
institutional ownership;  
Hand (2001) 
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Appendix 2: The Sample Firms  
 
This table lists the names, ticket symbols and IPO Exchange of the 40 Internet 
companies in our final sample. The initial sample consisted of firms retrieved by Capital 
IQ database companies which went public between 2009 and 2013. From this sample 
we retained only those firms that we judged to be Business to Consumer (B2C) models 
– 52 companies. We dropped 11 companies that went public in over-the-counter (OTC) 
markets because the information available is not the same to normal IPOs. We lost 1 
company because basic information, such as the number of outstanding stocks, was not 
found. 
 
  Firm name Ticker IPO Exchange 
1 Ancestry.com Inc. ACOM Nasdaq Global Market 
2 Angie's List, Inc. ANGI Nasdaq Global Market 
3 AVG Technologies N.V. AVG New York Stock Exchange 
4 Bankrate, Inc.  RATE Nasdaq Global Market 
5 Boingo Wireless, Inc.  WIFI Nasdaq Global Select 
6 CafePress Inc. PRSS Nasdaq Global Select 
7 Carbonite, Inc. CARB Nasdaq Global Market 
8 Changyou.com Limited  CYOU Nasdaq Global Select 
9 Demand Media, Inc. DMD New York Stock Exchange 
10 E-Commerce China Dangdang Inc.  DANG New York Stock Exchange 
11 Facebook, Inc.  FB Nasdaq Global Select 
12 FriendFinder Networks Inc. FFN Nasdaq Global Market 
13 Groupon, Inc.  GRPN Nasdaq Global Select 
14 HomeAway, Inc.  AWAY Nasdaq Global Select 
15 Jiayuan.com International Ltd.  DATE Nasdaq Global Select 
16 Kayak Software Corporation  KYAK Nasdaq Global Market 
17 LifeLock, Inc.  LOCK New York Stock Exchange 
18 LinkedIn Corporation  LNKD New York Stock Exchange 
19 MakeMyTrip Limited  MMYT Nasdaq Global Select 
20 NQ Mobile Inc.  NQ New York Stock Exchange 
21 OpenTable, Inc.  OPEN Nasdaq Global Select 
22 Pandora Media, Inc.  P New York Stock Exchange 
23 Phoenix New Media Limited  FENG New York Stock Exchange 
24 Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd  QIHU New York Stock Exchange 
25 QuinStreet, Inc.  QNST Nasdaq Global Select 
26 Renren Inc. RENN New York Stock Exchange 
27 Rosetta Stone, Inc.  RST New York Stock Exchange 
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28 Shanda Games Limited  GAME Nasdaq Global Select 
29 Sky-mobi Limited  MOBI Nasdaq Global Market 
30 SouFun Holdings Ltd.  SFUN New York Stock Exchange 
31 Taomee Holdings Ltd.  TAOM New York Stock Exchange 
32 Trulia, Inc.  TRLA New York Stock Exchange 
33 Vipshop Holdings Limited VIPS New York Stock Exchange 
34 Vitacost.com, Inc.  VITC Nasdaq Global Select 
35 Yandex N.V.  YNDX Nasdaq Global Select 
36 Yelp, Inc.  YELP New York Stock Exchange 
37 Youku Tudou Inc.  YOKU New York Stock Exchange 
38 YY Inc.  YY Nasdaq Global Market 
39 Zillow, Inc. Z Nasdaq Global Select 
40 Zynga, Inc.  ZNGA Nasdaq Global Select 
        
 
